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FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF OFFSHORE 35
                                                                                 SUPPORT VESSELS

the first time. At MSC 65, it has been decided that FSA is to be treated as a highly prioritized
item on the agenda [4]. Followingly, as mentioned above, in MSC 74, interim guidelines for FSA
has been developed. In order to promote Formal Safety Assessment and as well as risk analysis
for dealing with more complex problems, as mentioned above, Guidelines for Formal Safety
Assessment has been developed by IMO on [1]. Also, in 2012, IACS have put more attention to
this topic and prepared a presentation regarding MSC 75 on [2].

In the same sense, on [3] Christos Alex Kontovas has been extensively studied Formal Safety
Assessment with detailed explanation of all steps and pointed out critical points as well as possible
future role of this method. On [4], Quen-gen F., et al., have studied FSA on the view of human
error and a propose have been made in order to preventing human error in ship operations in 2005.
In this paper, formal safety assessment has been carried out and an assumption method has been
done to prevent human error. On [6], Akyildiz H. and Mentes A., carried out formal safety
assessment analysis for cargo ships and extensively conducted a research with the combination
of fault tree analysis. Therefore, this reference is very good application of combination of several
techniques. On [7], IACS prepared a study regarding the preparatory step of general cargo ships
which consists of detailed historical data of ship types, their accidents and risk and other relevant
information regarding the first step of formal safety assessment. As it is fair to assume that without
first step it is not possible to move further in FSA, this study provides very valuable information
for everyone. On [8], a formal safety assessment has been carried out for contained ships by Wang
J. and Foinikis P. on 5 January 2001 which is very detailed for fast and very busy container
operations. On [9], a historical data has been presented by Clarkson for offshore supply vessel
industry which creates this paper's historical data partly. On [10], annual overview of marine
casualties and incidents have been given by EMSA which is also a valuable historical data to be
used in step 1 in this paper. On [5] and [11] provided detailed information regarding historical
data, expert opinions and the investigation analysis in order to understand the problem and help
to proceed further into risk assessment with the application of FSA. The general point of view of
this paper is to understand and assess the risks of outgrowing industry and operational phases of
offshore supply vessels. Therefore, all these references have been carefully picked and a base
have been formed in order to create this assessment.

Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) has been developed to help IMO decision making process and
to make it more rational. While providing a such basis and support to decision making, it can be
used to assess and as a result improve maritime safety, including safety of life, health, the marine
environment and property. In this connection, FSA can be used as a tool to help in the evaluation
of new regulations for maritime safety and protection of the marine environment or in making a
comparison between existing and possibly improved regulations, with a view to achieving a
balance between the various technical and operational issues, including the human element, and
between maritime safety or protection of the marine environment and costs [1]. Additionally,
recognized organizations can use this tool for the assessment of individual ship designs and also
can be used together with ISM applications. As a result of this, decision authorities at IMO, using
FSA, may increase effectiveness of regulations by considering maritime safety including safety
of life, marine pollution and as well as cost related issues.

2. Generic Assessment of an Offshore Support Vessel

As a preparatory step and before going into Step 1 named as Hazard Identification (HAZID), we
need to assign some information for preparation to next steps. In this context, we focused on
Offshore Support Vessel as a generic case. In this regard, firstly we need to limit ourselves for
operational assumptions. After this, it is important to define ship life cycle as well as related ship

                                                                                             Sayı 6, 2016 GiDB|DERGi
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